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Abstract 
This paper presents an economic geography model with two differentiated sectors that exhibit 
weaker inter and stronger intra-industry input-output linkages. Labour is also differentiated 
according to skills in a hierarchy of tasks they can perform. Globalisation occurs in two 
distinct phases, leading to the agglomeration of an industry (manufacturing) in the first wave, 
which is subsequently displaced by the other industry (services) when the second wave of 
globalisation takes place. Because of agglomeration effects, the increase in relative 
endowment of a factor may increase its relative wages, leading to more inequality. Within 
and between nations inequality can result. 
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1 Introduction
A Historical and Contemporary Overview In 1750, before the
Industrial Revolution, China and India produced almost 60 per cent of
the worlds manufactured goods. Yet, at the turn of the 20th century,
the UK was considered the workshop of the world as it produced and
exported a huge range of manufactured goods. China and Indias share of
world manufacturing became minuscule. Manufacturing was also highly
concentrated. Three countries - UK, Germany and the United States -
accounted for more than 50 per cent of global manufacturing output in
1900 [Figure 1]1.
Figure 1: Share of World Manufacturing 1750 - 1900
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Today, manufacturing is but a small share of the UKs GDP, falling
from 30 per cent in 1973 to 16 per cent in 20032. In its place, a thriving
service sector has emerged as epitomised by the city of London. UK
exports services to the rest of the world in exchange for manufactured
goods. Its per capita service exports are the highest among the G-7 major
industrialised nations. In 2006, its service trade recorded a US$53 billion
1Paul Bairoch, International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980
2Source: Confederation of British Industries (CBI).
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surplus while merchandise trade recorded a decit of US$143 billion,
a persistent pattern of exporting services and importing manufactured
goods [Figure 2]. If one considers only two broad categories of production
- goods and services - and breaks down the current account as such, a
clear pattern of specialisation amongst major developed and emerging
economies has also emerged [See Appendix]. English speaking countries
like the UK, United States, Australia, and even India are increasingly
specialising in services and exporting them on a net basis.
Figure 2: UK Current Account Breakdown into Goods and Services
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On the other side of the world, a di¤erent process is taking place. East
Asian economies, including China, have been rapidly industrialising as
they become more integrated with the global economy. Within the last
three decades, China has transformed itself from an agrarian economy to
become one of the largest exporters of manufactured goods to the devel-
oped countries. There is a great concentration of manufacturing activities
in the cities along Chinas eastern coast and in East Asia more generally.
Today, China, Japan and Korea are some of the largest net exporters of
manufactured goods, alongside Germany and Brazil [See Appendix]. The
evolution of industrial structure and the general equilibrium implications
for factor prices are important research questions.
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Two major themes emerge here. Firstly, some developed economies
leading the globalisation process are also witnessing the deindustrialisa-
tion and o¤shoring of manufacturing activities, popularly known as The
Great Sucking Sound. The Anglo-Saxon economies have become some
of the largest net importers of manufactured goods, giving rise to the fear
of industrial hollowing out and job losses. As Richard E. Baldwin and
Philippe Martin (1999) note, The annual rate of de-industrialisation [of
OECD countries] jumped sharply as globalisation picked up pace in the
1980s3. On a smaller spatial scale, the loss of manufacturing for New
York and London for example has been well documented [Peter Gripaios
(1977); Robert Dennis (1978); Frank P. Romo and Michael Schwartz
(1995)].
Secondly, there has been a marked increase in inequality as a result
of the stagnation of blue-collar wages [John Bound and George Johnson
(1992, 1995); Baldwin and Martin (1999)]. More recently, even the o¤-
shoring of some white-collar jobs has become a source of concern. It has
led some economists to point out the potential causal link between o¤-
shoring and wage stagnation [Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson
(1999)]. The link between trade, wages and income inequality is still con-
tentious since many economists nd skill-biased technological change to
be the more plausible explanation of blue-collar wage stagnation. How-
ever, the hypothesis that globalisation has resulted in greater income
inequality is still a source of keen academic and policy debate, partly be-
cause of the contemporaneous nature of de-industrialisation, o¤shoring,
and blue-collar wage stagnation of developed economies.
The key questions remain: Why has so much manufacturing been
o¤shored to developing countries in recent years? Why has the recent
wave of globalisation been marked with blue-collar wage stagnation in
developed countries and rising within nation inequality [Baldwin and
Martin (1999)]? Can the Shifts in Economic Geography?[Anthony J.
Venables (2006)] be the missing links that explain the contemporaneous
occurrence of de-industrialisation and wage inequality?
3David Kucera and William Milberg (2002) estimate that trade expansion between
OCED and non-OCED countries has resulted in the loss of 3.4 million manufacturing
jobs in 10 OECD countries between 1978 and 1990.
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Two Waves of Globalisation The two waves mentioned in this
paper have specic denitions4. In this paper, the rst wave of globali-
sation is characterised by goods trade liberalisation. This can be inter-
preted as the lowering of tari¤s for merchandise (manufactured) goods
or a fall in shipping or freight costs5. The earlier rounds of General
Agreement on Tari¤ and Trade (GATT) contributed to the process of
multilateral reduction in import tari¤s. In this rst globalisation wave,
the services sector remained largely protected from foreign competition
(i.e., high trade costs) by legal frameworks, regulations, language, or pos-
sibly even cultural and social norms. The exact nature of these costs will
not be investigated in this paper.
Services here refer to a range of activities such as nance, banking,
insurance, consulting, advertising, marketing, legal work that supply to
global consumers and businesses [see the global city literature, Saskia
Sassen (1991)]. These are the advanced producer and nancial services
sectors that serve the command and control requirement of transnational
capital[Neil Brenner (1998)] - which in essence are activities that require
a high skill content, as opposed to Balassa-Samuelson type of services like
haircuts or plumbing.
In the second wave of globalisation, this paper assumes that services
trade costs fall. There are several reasons why one should treat the lib-
eralisation of services trade as a distinct process. The rst explanation is
due to technology. The sharp fall in telecommunication costs (as opposed
to shipping costs for goods), digitisation of information, proliferation of
the internet, are more recent phenomena compared to the rst wave of
globalisation. The fall in communication costs has opened up a whole
range of services that can be carried out away from where production
of goods takes place or where the consumers or downstream rms lo-
cate. Similarly, outsourcing of o¢ ce backroom services would not have
been economical without the breakthrough in telecommunication tech-
nology. Secondly, many countries have also carried out internal reforms
to liberalise their services industries (such as the Big Bang in Londons
nancial services sector), allowing a greater degree of market access by
4The historical stylised facts of the two waves of globalisation are described in
detail in Baldwin and Martin (1999).
5Bairoch (1989) estimates that the 800-km shipment transport cost for iron goods
as a percentage of production cost to be 27 per cent in 1830, 21 per cent in 1850, 10
per cent in 1880, and 6 per cent in 1910. Shipping costs therefore had already fallen
signicantly prior to the First World War.
4
foreign rms. The expansion and deepening of the EU as a single mar-
ket has also increased market access. Even the greater use of English
as a business language can be seen as a reduction of trade cost. These
are all relatively recent phenomena compared to the earlier goods trade
liberalisation.
Economic Geography in Two Historical Episodes Why might
it then be useful to consider trade liberalisation in two episodes? The
conclusion of most NEG models is that economic activity can become
unevenly spread - allowing a core and a periphery structure to develop
[see Anthony J. Venables (2006) for an overview of theory and evidence].
When trade costs are high, production is dispersed in order to serve
local markets that cannot otherwise be accessed through trade. When
trade costs fall to an intermediate level, agglomeration can result. The
salient point about these models is that below a certain level of trade cost
(break point), the dispersion of economic activity will not be a stable
equilibrium. As Krugman and Venables (1995) show with a horizontal
linkages model, a small cost advantage in one location brought about by
input-output linkages begets a greater cost advantage by attracting more
rms, eventually leading to an outcome characterised by the Inequality
of Nations. Stephen J. Redding and Venables (2004) empirically conrm
the importance of market access and sources of supply in explaining
variation in per capita income across countries. However, most NEG
models do not make any distinction between industries, and are generally
silent on which industries actually agglomerate where6.
Following Masahisa Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)7, this pa-
per assumes two di¤erentiated industries (and one homogeneous indus-
try). To help x ideas, the two di¤erentiated industries are called man-
ufacturing and services respectively. The rst main idea of this paper
is that unlike the assumption of many NEG models, trade costs for the
two di¤erent industries do not fall symmetrically. Rather, this paper
assumes that goods trade is liberalised before services trade, thereby al-
lowing manufacturing to agglomerate rst.
The agglomeration of manufacturing rms gives rise to an endoge-
nous comparative advantage in the sense that the cost of production (ex-
6Except for the distinction between homogeneous agriculture (or the numeraire
sector) and the di¤erentiated sector.
7Henceforth known as FKV.
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cluding wages) becomes relatively lower. Also, there exist input-output
linkages between industries. As manufacturing agglomerates in one lo-
cation, it also draws in services rms (without services being liberalised)
simply because manufacturing rms also buy services. This gives the
manufacturing location a headstart in services even in the absence of
services liberalisation. When services are nally liberalised, this head
start becomes a lock-in cost of production advantage, making services
rms agglomerate there as well, but potentially displacing manufactur-
ing (or deindustrialisation) in the process8.
Inequality Within Nations While inequality between nations is
the result of early NEG models [Krugman and Venables (1995)], much of
the recent debate, controversy about, and opposition to, globalisation is
that it creates inequality within nations [Baldwin and Martin (1999)]. On
an intuitive level, this is connected to the rst theme - namely that man-
ufacturing (including outsourcing of intermediate goods) has relocated
from developed western economies to East Asia (rst Japan, then the
Asian Tigers and nally China) - and how this deindustrialisation has
put blue-collar workers under downward wage pressures [Feenstra and
Hanson (1999)]. Furthermore, Brenner (1998) notes that social research
into global cities has been dominated by some inter-related themes, in-
cluding deindustrialisation, . . , expansion and spatial concentration of
nancial and producer services industries, labour market-segmentation,
. . . , socio-spatial polarisation.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is to make use of what
is already a standard NEG model and embed it with a multi-industries
and multi-factors setup, in which globalisation inuences the changes
in industrial structure, eventually leading to both within and between
8A fore-runner to this paper is by Baldwin, Martin and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano
(2001) - henceforth known as BMO - which shows that intermediate levels of trade
costs may cause industries to agglomerate in the North, a result that is consistent with
standard NEG predictions. But when the cost of trading ideasfalls (that is, greater
global spillover of knowledge), it can result in the relative deindustrialisationof the
North, which in that exposition is simply the loss of industries (without being precise
on what kind of industries are lost). Unlike BMO (2001), there is no accumulation
of capital, no technology spillovers, no learning e¤ects and no cost of trading ideas.
Furthermore, this paper shows that the loss of manufacturing is not merely relative,
but absolute. The second and distinct wave of globalisation can result in a shift in
the endogenously determined comparative advantage - away from manufacturing and
to services. As the North gains services rms, it can lose manufacturing rms in
absolute terms.
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nation inequality.
Limitations NEG models are not without their critics9. Firstly,
many of the results stem from a specic functional form - namely CES
preferences. Secondly, some results such as the home market e¤ect de-
pend on the simplifying assumption that there is a homogeneous good
(or sometimes known as agriculture) that is competitively produced and
costlessly traded to equalise the wage between two locations. Donald
R. Davis (1998) shows that the costless trading assumption is not sup-
ported empirically, and that the home market e¤ect disappears if one as-
sumes trade costs to be the same for industrial and homogeneous goods.
Thirdly, many NEG models make use of the simplifying assumption that
consumption of the di¤erentiated good is a small proportion of total in-
come which ensures incomplete specialisation in equilibrium10. This as-
sumes away any congestion cost that arises from agglomeration, leading
to bang-bangpredictions - that is, full agglomeration of all industries
in one location or the other - that are not observed in reality. Finally,
NEG models are often analytically intractable, particularly those with
feedback loops, and are often only solved by numerical methods.
Many of the simplifying assumptions employed in many NEG models
will also be used in this paper, and many of the criticisms will also
apply. In particular, the model still relies on the agriculture good as
the numeraire. It also relies on numerical solutions to illustrate the key
points. In defence however, the model that this paper uses is one where
input-output linkages drive the agglomeration process. Its conclusions
therefore do not depend on the home market e¤ect. In addition, as
mentioned in the introduction, one of the objectives of this paper is to
capture the displacement e¤ect. This essentially is to move away from
the bang-bangpredictions of many NEG models, thereby generating
more realistic outcomes for industrial locations.
9Peter J. Neary (2000) provides an interesting exposition on the shortcoming of
various NEG models.
10An alternate way of putting this is that the agricultural sector continues to op-
erate in both regions to equalise wages. The monopolistic but atomistic rms in the
industrial sector e¤ectively face an innite supply of labour at the given wage rate.
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2 Model Setup
2.1 Regions
There are two regions in the model, North and South, subscripted by
(j = N;S). There are three industries - the agricultural industry A
acting as the walrasian, costlessly transported, numeraire good, and two
di¤erentiated industries - manufacturing and services. Factors of pro-
duction are immobile between the two regions.
2.2 A Hierarchy of Skills and Industries
There are three primary factors in the model - high-skilled (K), semi-
skilled (L) and unskilled labour (O). All workers are immobile between
countries. There is a hierarchy of jobs that they can perform. High-
skilled labour can work in all industries. Semi-skilled skilled workers can
only work in manufacturing and agriculture; they are unproductive in
services. Unskilled workers can only work in the agricultural industry,
and are unproductive if used in the other two sectors. The skill level
of a worker is therefore characterised by the range of tasks that he can
perform. For example, a PhD can become equally productive as a farmer
when he is deployed to a farm, but a farmer has zero productivity when
deployed to a university. Succinctly put, a skilled worker is a perfect
substitute for all workers with skills below him but an unskilled or semi-
skilled worker is not a substitute for the worker type above him.
There are many reasons why this specication is attractive. Consider
an alternative formulation where one allows the more productive worker
a Ricardian improvement in his productivity. In e¤ect, this specication
then becomes a unit of measure issue - that is, e¤ective labour units. If
workerK is twice as productive as worker L, he simply becomes two times
worker L and draws twice the wage. In a general equilibrium analysis,
one just needs the knowledge of e¤ective labour units to pin down the
market size. Furthermore, it also does not matter where each industry
agglomerates. Within each location, the ratio of wages will just reect
the Ricardian productivity di¤erence in any full employment equilibrium.
However, by reformulating the problem into one that has a hierarchy
of jobs, the e¤ective constraint placed on each industry becomes di¤erent.
The lowest order industry - agriculture - has the highest potential pool of
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workers. The services industry, which can only use K-type workers, has
the smallest potential pool of workers. The manufacturing industry is in
between. When agglomeration takes place, di¤erent industries will have
di¤erent e¤ective constraints on their expansion. In NEG parlance, the
congestion costs will be di¤erent for various industries, thereby resulting
in di¤erent equilibrium wages where di¤erent industries agglomerate11.
To prevent any Hecksher-Ohlin motivation for trade, this paper as-
sumes that both countries have the same endowments of unskilled, semi-
skilled and skilled workers12
ON = OS = O LN = LS = L KN = KS = K
Even though both locations have exactly the same endowments, com-
parative advantagenevertheless arises in equilibrium because of the ag-
glomeration process driven by the existence of input output linkages.
The characterisation of agricultural unskilled workers requires a little
more explanation. In standard NEG models, workers are homogeneous.
The presence of the agricultural sector in both regions, implied by a small
consumption share of industrial goods, makes it easy to characterise the
equilibrium. The agricultural sector simply serves as the bu¤er sector;
any workers not used in industrial production are deployed in agricul-
ture. Labour market clearing is achieved with great simplicity. The
same mechanism is at work here with some modications.
E¤ectively, the labour market works this way. If the supply of skilled
labour is greater than the demand in services for it, the excess supply will
be added to the manufacturing sector alongside the semi-skilled labour
pool. Given the manufacturing sector labour demand for semi-skilled
workers, the excess supply of semi-skilled workers will be used in the
11The labour market need not be quite so dichotomous. For example, one can allow
both manufacturing and services to use both skilled and semi-skilled workers, with
services having a higher skill intensity compared to manufacturing. It is possible to
create the same qualitative result. However, the choice of endowment will become
more important in this alternative setup. For example, in the rst wave of global-
isation when manufacturing agglomerates, the wages for semi-skilled workers might
rise above skilled workers since they are used more intensively, thereby presenting
interpretational di¢ culties. With the setup presented in this paper, this anomaly
will never arise since K-type workers are a perfect substitute for L-types but not the
other way around. Less skilled workers will never receive more than their more skilled
counterparts in any equilibrium conguration.
12This will be relaxed later to highlight the e¤ect of endowment on changes in
industrial specialisation and wages.
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agricultural sector. Excess labour e¤ectively cascades or overows down-
wards. Unskilled labour, together with what is left from manufacturing
and services, then becomes the bu¤er in the same way that the agricul-
tural sector acts as the bu¤er in many NEG models.
2.3 Consumer
Each worker, regardless of type, maximises utility over all types of goods
in a simple Quasi-linear utility13
U = A+ M lnXM + S lnXS (1)
where XM =
hR
x
 1

Mi di
i 
 1
and XS =
hR
x
 1

Si di
i 
 1
are the CES ag-
gregated manufacturing and services good respectively, and M and S
measures the intensity of consumption of both sectors. Furthermore, XS
is aforementioned to be advanced producer services, it is reasonable to
assume that S < M - in other words, a consumer lower direct purchases
from this sector14.
From equation (1), the demands of each consumer for agriculture,
manufacturing and services are given as follows
DA = w   S   M DM =
M
PM
DS =
S
PS
(2)
where w is the wage, PM and PS are the CES aggregated prices. The
coe¢ cients are constrained S + M < w so that there will be a positive
consumption of the A good.
Within each di¤erentiated sector, each consumers demands still take
the usual CES form
13The model works with a Cobb-Douglas utility function as well. In equilibrium,
di¤erent worker types will be paid di¤erent wage rates. With Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences, this implies that expenditures on each class of good is di¤erent for each type of
worker. The Quasi-linear preferences allow us to ignore these income e¤ect considera-
tions. All workers, regardless of how much they are paid in equilibrium, will demand
the same amount of XM and XS . Higher income translates to higher demand for the
A good. The upshot of this is that there will not be any home market e¤ectarising
from consumer expenditure for the di¤erentiated industries. All agglomeration is due
to forward and backward linkages on the production side.
14This assumption has no bearing on the qualitative pattern of results except to
note that if the intensity of demand for services is too high, the equilibrium will show
dispersion of the services industry even at low levels of services trade costs since skilled
workers are assumed to be evenly spread between the two locations.
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dM =
p M M
P 1 M
dS =
p M S
P 1 S
(3)
In equilibrium, di¤erent worker types will potentially receive di¤erent
wages due to the presence of agglomeration rents. But with the quasi-
linear function, there are no income e¤ects for the di¤erentiated sectors.
Therefore, following (3), the rm level demands become
dM =
p M M
P 1 M
dS =
p S S
P 1 S
(4)
where  simply aggregates across the population of consumers (held as
a constant throughout), since all of them have the same expenditure on
manufacturing and service.
2.4 Production Technology
Production in sector A is standard - 1 worker to produce 1 unit of the
good. Production in sectorsM and S exhibits increasing returns to scale
with a xed cost f and variable cost . The cost function is homothetic,
both xed and variable costs use the factors in the same intensity. In
addition, there are input-output linkages. For manufacturing, within or
intra-industry linkages are captured by M and external or inter-industry
linkages are captured by M . Intra-industry input-output linkages are
assumed to be stronger than inter-industry input-output linkages. The
labour share is M = 1  M   M .
The total cost function for M type rm in country j is therefore
CMj = (F + xMj)w
M
j P
M
Mj
P
M
Sj
M (5)
Similarly, the cost function for rm S rm in country j becomes
CSj = (F + xSj)w
S
j P
S
Sj
P
S
Mj
S
where Pj is the CES aggregated price over all di¤erentiated goods,  is
the per unit input requirement, and with M and S simply the constants
of cost minimisation15.
15It is not necessary to assume that the linkages are symmetric between the two
di¤erentiated industries. The input-output table (see Appendix) suggests they are
not. However, in the numerical simulations later, the inter and intra-industry linkages
are nevertheless assumed to be symmetric as this has no relevance for the qualitative
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2.5 Trade Cost
Both manufacturing and services sectors face iceberg trade cost when
exporting goods and services. However, in contrast to most Economic
Geography models, this paper has elected to model di¤erent trade costs
M and S for manufacturing and services respectively. The reason be-
hind this is to allow the globalisation process to occur as two distinct
and separate processes for the two industries, roughly in keeping with
the historical evidence.
The rst wave of globalisation is captured by a decrease in M from
some arbitrarily high levels, thus freeing up goods trade. While trade
in goods becomes freer, trade in services is still not possible due to pro-
hibitive trade barriers - high communication costs, language, legal, reg-
ulatory barriers - all captured by S. The second wave of globalisation
captures the e¤ect of trade liberalisation in services. Following standard
notation, two freeness (phi-ness) of trade indices for the two sectors are
dened as phi-M (M = 
1 
M ) and phi-S (S = 
1 
S ) respectively.
2.6 Unit Cost and Prices
The CES function gives the standard aggregated prices for the M or S
sectors, PM and PS respectively (and with asterisk for the South). Given
the description of the wages above, the unit cost functions can be written
as
cM = w
M
L P
M
M P
M
S M c

M = w
M
L P
M
M P
M
S M (6)
cS = w
S
K P
S
S P
S
M S c

S = w
S
K P
S
S P
S
M S
Therefore, the unit cost functions depend not only on the aggregate
prices, but also the kind of wages faced by each industry (which may
no longer be 1 for every worker everywhere). The wage of semi-skilled
and skilled workers wL and wK , together with the counterparts in the
South wL and w

K , will be endogenised in equilibrium. Their values will
depend on the patterns of agglomeration that emerge.
result.
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2.7 Prots
The prot function of each manufacturing rm in the North can be writ-
ten as
M =
1



   1cM
1  
M + MRM + SRS
P 1 M
+ M

M + MR

M + SR

S
P 1 M

 cMF
(7)
where RM and RS are Norths aggregate intermediate purchases by the
manufacturing and services sector respectively (to be dened later). Hence,
the manufacturing rm charges an optimal price of 
 1cM , which is a
constant mark up over its unit cost. The terms inside the curly brackets
provide the total market potential perceived by the rm from home sales
(rst term) and export sales (second term). The xed cost is given by
cMF . Since the two locations have the same population size, M = 

M .
Similarly for the services industry, the prot function can be written as
S =
1



   1cS
1  
S + SRS + MRM
P 1 S
+ S

S + SR

S + MR

M
P 1 S

 cSF
If more manufacturing rms locate to the North, the market potential in
the North increases relative to that in the South because of the presence
of backward linkages. There will be more rms at the same location
that demand its products as intermediates. At the same time, because
of the intra-industry linkages, the unit cost in the North will fall relative
to that in the South (forward linkages) since the intermediates are no
longer subjected to trade costs.
In the South, the prot functions are exactly analogous and are given
by
M =
1



   1c

M
1  
M

M + MRM + SRS
P 1 M

+
M + MR

M + SR

S
P 1 M

 cMF
(8)
S =
1



   1c

S
1  
S

S + SRS + MRM
P 1 S

+
S + SR

S + MR

M
P 1 S

 cSF
Some Normalisations To simplify the notations, the paper makes a
few convenient normalisations [see Economic Geography & Public Policy
by Baldwin et al]. Firstly,  =  1

thereby simplifying the cost of each
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unit to 1. Secondly, F = 1

. Take for example a prot function in
equation (7). By using these normalisations, the prot function can be
written as
M =
1

cM

c M

M + MRM + SRS
P 1 M
+ M

M + MR

M + SR

S
P 1 M

  1

where the terms inside the curly brackets represent output given the CES
preference. Given these two normalisations, the paper makes use of the
standard result that the production scale consistent with zero-prot is
x = 1
This greatly reduces the notations and also simplies later numerical
analysis. Note that in equilibrium, the total input requirement of each
rm is given as (x+f), which because of the above normalisation is also
equal to 1. Each rm therefore will demand one physical unit of input
in equilibrium.
2.8 WorkersTypes and Equilibrium Wage Rates
The price of good A is chosen as the numeraire. Since unskilled workers
are immobile to other industries, the agricultural sector must operate in
both countries, thereby pinning down low-skilled wages as wO = 1. If
all K-type workers are employed in the S sector, then wK > wL in equi-
librium. Otherwise, K-type workers would be better o¤ in the manufac-
turing sector, and the labour market cannot be in equilibrium. Writing
these explicitly
wK =
(
wK K
d
N = KN
wL K
d
N < KN
)
(9)
where wK indicates the equilibrium wage and KdN is the conditional de-
mand for skilled labour in the North. This is given by
KdN =

S
S
S S
S
S  PS
wK
S PM
wK
S
nS (10)
which is simply the demand per services rm multiplied by the number
of services rms in the North nS since each rm demands 1 unit of input
given the normalisation. Equation (10) is therefore the total derived
14
demand for skilled labour given the number of rms operating in that
particular location16.
In equilibrium, it is possible that not all K-type workers will work
in services (KN   KdN > 0). In that case, those K-type workers not
employed in services will choose to work in manufacturing and be o¤ered
wage wL. The wage function of wL becomes
wL =
(
wL L
d
N = LN + (KN  KdN)
wO = 1 Otherwise
)
(11)
where conditional demand for manufacturing labour is given as
LdN =

M
M
M M
M
M PM
wL
M PS
wL
M
nM (12)
and nM is the number of manufacturing rms in the North17. The same
set of equations for wK and w

L can also be written for the South analo-
gously, providing a total of four wage equations.
The above equations also give a sense on why an analytical solution
might prove di¢ cult. The wage functions are non-di¤erentiable as they
are discontinuous at the point at which the supply constraint binds. In
contrast, the wage rate is determined by the price of the agricultural good
in an equilibrium characterised by incomplete specialisation. As can be
seen from the above equations, wages are a function of local conditional
demands (which depend on the number of rms at each location), which
is also a function of wages. The mapping of wages onto rms and then
back onto wages makes it di¢ cult to solve this problem analytically18.
2.9 Denition of Intermediate Revenues and Total
Wage
Intermediate revenues are given in a standard way, simply the total cost of
all rms. The intermediate revenues for North and South manufacturing
16O¤ equilibrium, if conditional demand is larger than supply of factor KdN > KN ,
wage wK has to increase until the equilibrium value wK solves for KdN = KN . If
conditional demand is not larger than the supply at that location, wK must fall to
that of the next skill tier wL.
17Again, in an o¤ equilibrium situation where LdN > LN + (KN   KdN ), then wL
must increase until the equilibrium value wL solves for LdN = LN + (KN  KdN ). If
LdN < LN + (KN   KdN ), then wL will take the value of 1 since some semi-skilled
workers will work in the agricultural sector.
18The wage functions are also non-di¤erentiable.
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are
RM = nMcM(x+ F ) R

M = n

Mc

M(x+ F ) (13)
Similarly, the intermediate revenues for North and South services are
RS = nScS(x+ F ) R

S = n

Sc

S(x+ F )
Total incomes (which are equal to expenditures) are given by
E = wKKN + wLLN +ON E
 = wKKS + w

LLS +OS (14)
With these, agriculture demands are given by
A = E   M   S A = E   M   S
With the quasi-linear preferences, only the demand for agriculture is
a¤ected by changes in wage incomes.
3 Solving for Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium Conditions
Typically in a NEG model, the number of rms is xed in the short-
run while other endogenous variables adjust. In the long run, all the
conditions of the short-run equilibrium are met while allowing the free
entry conditions (rmsentry and exit) to be satised. But since this
paper is concerned with the long-run evolution of industrial locations and
factor returns over two episodes of globalisation, it makes no distinction
between the short and long-run solution. Instead, all variables are allowed
to adjust towards the long-run equilibrium from the onset for every level
of given trade costs. The equilibrium is characterised by a vector of
eight endogenous variables {nM , nM , nS, n

S, wK , wL, w

K , w

L} that are
pinned down by the four zero-prot conditions and four wage equations
such that:
(a) all rms make zero prots given entry, exit and relocation and;
(b) goods markets clear and;
(c) there is no excess demand or supply for skilled, semi-skilled or
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unskilled labour given the equilibrium wages in both locations.
3.2 Adjustment Process
Given a specic level of trade costs, the numerical solutions begin by
imposing a symmetric (arbitrary) number of rms to both locations. A
small positive shock ("F = 0:01) to the number of manufacturing rms
is given to one location, and a small negative shock ( "F ) is applied to
another, to break the initial symmetry.
Step 1 Firms are allowed to enter, exit or relocate. If both North and
South rms have positive prots given the number of existing rms, a
small increment (+"F ) in the number of rms is further applied to both
locations - this is entry. If both North and South rms continue to have
negative prots, a small decrease ( "F ) in the number of rms is applied
due to exit. If the North has higher prots than the South, rms migrate
northwards (+"F for the North and  "F for the South) for relocation.
Vice versa.
Step 2 Local labour markets adjust. Given the interim number of
rms in both North and South after the step 1 adjustments, the de-
mand for labour for the industry for each location can be derived using
the cost minimising demand function [see equations (10) and (12)]. If
demand for skilled labour from services exceeds supply at a particular
location, the local skilled wages will move upwards in a small increment
("W = 0:0001)19. If not, the excess skilled labour is added to the local
pool of semi-skilled labour or downward cascading. Again, the demand
for labour from manufacturing is checked against this pool. If demand
exceeds supply, even the semi-skilled wage moves upwards (also bumping
up skilled wages in the process since skilled wages cannot be lower than
semi-skilled labour in equilibrium). Otherwise, any excess overows into
the unskilled labour pool too, which then serves the numeraire sector
agriculture.
Iteration Steps 1 and 2 are iterated until the equilibrium conditions
stated are met. This will then give the long-run number of rms and
19The adjustment parameters "F and "W represent a search increment of a magni-
tude that is one-hundredth of a per cent of the underlying variables.
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wages in each location.
3.3 Model Parameters
The key parameters in this model are the intra and inter-industry linkages
as they determine the strength of the agglomeration forces as well as the
wages in equilibrium. In a two-sector setup, it is necessary that the intra-
industry linkages are stronger than inter-industry ones for agglomeration
to take place. Otherwise, both industries will tend to disperse rather
than agglomerate since the benets of co-location with another industry
is greater than each industry locating in one location [see FKV for further
exposition]. The input-output table provides strong evidence that intra-
industry linkages are indeed stronger [see Appendix]20. Solutions with
other parameters are also provided in the Appendix.
4 Results
4.1 Autarky Results
Economic activity is completely dispersed in the autarky equilibrium. All
labour types have the same wage, equal to the numeraire. This is due
to the fact that the paper has chosen factor endowment such that factor
supplies of skilled and semi-skilled workers exceed the demands for them
in the absence of agglomeration. Since prices are also the same in both
locations given the symmetry of the regions, real wages are also equal.
There is no inequality between or within nations.
4.2 First Wave of Globalisation
In the rst wave of globalisation, trade costs in services are kept arbitrar-
ily high such that S = 0 (no services trade is possible). In the numerical
solutions, the trade cost for manufacturing is gradually lowered (increase
in phi-M). Two sets of equilibrium paths are possible - one with greater
a concentration of both manufacturing and services in the North (shares
greater than 0.5) and the other with a greater concentration in the South.
20In the numerical simulations, this paper assumes the intra- and inter-industry
linkages of both sectors to be symmetric. Though the IO table suggests that they are
slightly di¤erent, it does not change the results qualitatively, so long as intra-industry
linkages are stronger.
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This can be seen in Figure 3, where the Y-axis shows the share of rms
for each industry located in the North plotted against phi-M (X-axis).
Wage-sustain andWage-break Points The denitions of break and
sustain points are slightly di¤erent from traditional NEG models since
the parameters and endowments are chosen so agglomeration will result
in the rise of wages due to the limited endowments. In a symmetric
equilibrium, both locations have exactly the same number of services
and manufacturing rms, and wages everywhere for all types of workers
will be the numeraire wage (wK = wK = wL = w

L = 1).
In order to make a distinction between the break/sustain point as
used in the standard NEG literature, this paper introduces the wage-
break or wage-sustain points21. The wage-break point is dened as the
level of trade cost (which can be equivalently expressed in terms of trade
freeness) that allows wage symmetry between the types of labour within
a location to be broken. The wage-sustain point is the level of trade
cost that allows a wage di¤erential between the types of labour to be
sustained in a location.
For example, the manufacturing wage-break point is the level of trade
freeness BM which allows the symmetric distribution of manufacturing to
break in favour of one location, resulting in a premium on manufactur-
ing wages in that location. Similarly, the manufacturing wage-sustain
pointis the level of trade freeness SM that allows manufacturing wages
to be sustained at a higher level, with the maximum level of agglomera-
tion as the initial condition.
Tomahawk Diagram The tomahawk diagram plots the shares of rms
of the North (Souths shares are simply the complement) on the Y-axis
against the level of trade freedom phi-M on the X-axis. The rm share
diagram is a multiple pitchforkas there is more than one industry. The
wage-break and wage-sustained points can be clearly seen in the Figure
322.
21In the standard NEG literature, the break point is the value of trade costs at
which the symmetric equilibrium with equal shares of industry between two loca-
tions becomes unstable. The sustain point is the value of trade costs at which the
asymmetric equilibrium (with agglomeration) can be sustained.
22As standard in NEG models, the sustain point comes before the break point since
the value of trade costs at which the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable is lower
(or phi-ness higher) than the value of trade costs at which the asymmetric equilibrium
(agglomeration) can be sustained. There is a region of overlap between the two (see
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Figure 3: Tomahawk Diagram (First Wave)
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The outer pitchfork lines (in solid blue) show the equilibrium shares of
manufacturing while the inner pitchfork shows the equilibrium shares of
services (in dotted red). Though there is no services trade, its shares are
inuenced by the shares of manufacturing as a result of the inter-industry
linkages, as shown in the inner pitchforks. Since supply of skilled and
semi-skilled labour is nite and wages increase when these constraints
are reached, the pitchfork lines represent the maximum shares that do
not reach 1 or 0. In other words, the equilibrium does not exhibit a
bang-bangoutcome.
The level of endowments relative to the size of consumption will de-
termine how much agglomeration can take place. For example, given a
constant consumption intensity in the preferences, a symmetric increase
in the endowment of K-type labour in both the North and South will
widen the pitchforks by allowing more agglomeration to take place before
BM and 
S
M in Figure 3) where both the agglomeration or symmetric equilibrium
are stable, depending on the initial conditions. Because of the possibility of multiple
equilibria in this region of overlap, expectations become important since some rms
may shift location in anticipation that this will change the initial conditions enough
to trigger agglomeration. To keep exposition simple, this paper ignores the role of
expectation.
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resource constraints start to bind.
Agglomeration Rents When the labour resource limits are reached,
labour begins to earn agglomeration rents. For example, when manufac-
turing agglomerates in one location and exhausts the pool of skilled and
semi-skilled labour, entry rms bid up the equilibrium wages according
to equations (9) and (11). The evolution of wages is given in Figure 4. As
a result of manufacturing agglomeration, skilled and semi-skilled workers
begin to command a wage premium over unskilled workers (whose wage
is set to 1). The standard hump-shape feature of the equilibrium wage
path is that inequality is highest at intermediate levels of merchandise
trade costs - rising quickly after the wage-sustain point SM and falling
gradually as trade cost falls further.
From the wage break point BM , there is a small discrete jump in the
wages as the symmetric equilibrium is broken. In this rst wave, the
change in wage structure is driven by the agglomeration of manufactur-
ing. As manufacturing uses both K and L types, the agglomeration rent
is shared between these two types of workers. This also implies that ser-
vices demand for skilled workers does not exhaust the supply of all skilled
workers, and some of them are employed in the manufacturing sector in
equilibrium.
4.3 Second Wave of Globalisation
Goods trade costs are held at a constant level (M = 0:7 or M = 1:10).
Given this level of M , the paper solves for the long-run equilibrium when
services trade becomes free (from S = 0 to 1). The services wage-
break point is the level of services trade cost, below which services
reaches maximum agglomeration and exhausts the sector specic factor.
In other words, the services wage-break point is reached when K type
wages become higher than L type wages (wK > wL or wK > w

L).
In order to reduce the number of possible equilibrium development
paths and to simplify the exposition, the paper shows only one set of
equilibrium paths for the second wave of globalisation - one that assumes
that the North has a larger share of manufacturing in the rst wave.
This is broadly consistent with the historical pattern since the Industrial
Revolution. The fact that trade costs fall sequentially (goods rst then
services) becomes important here. The key thing to note is that even
21
Figure 4: Norths Equilibrium Wages (First Wave)
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though services is not liberalised in the rst wave, the North has an
initial advantage in services. From an arbitrarily high level of trade
costs, services trade becomes freer (moving right on the X-axis in Figure
5).
As services trade is freed, services sector rms begin to agglomerate
in the North quickly as a result of the initial advantage (see Figure 5).
As skilled workers begin to migrate away from manufacturing and into
services, there is a contraction of manufacturing activities in the North,
relocated to the South. The wage-break point occurs at around S = 0:2
(this can be related to Figure 6, at the same S where wK becomes
higher than wL). There is location hysteresis, but only for the services
sector. Since this is a model with horizontal linkages, the relocation of
manufacturing activities to the South e¤ectively becomes o¤shoring since
rms in the North will use a greater share of intermediates produced in
the South (pseudo-o¤shoring).
When services trade becomes very liberalised at around S = 0:8
(Figure 5), the North experiences a precipitous loss of manufacturing or
large scale deindustrialisation. This discontinuity occurs because of the
following reason. When services trade is initially liberalised, the presence
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Figure 5: Tomahawk Diagram (Second Wave) North
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of a large services sector agglomerating in the North o¤ers manufacturing
rms lower cost of production, since manufacturing rms also demand
services intermediates. The inter-industry forward linkages induce a size-
able number of manufacturers to maintain their presence in the North at
intermediate levels of services trade liberalisation (from S values of 0.2
to 0.8). However, further liberalisation of services can bring the equilib-
rium into a tipping point when even the South can access services inter-
mediates from the North cheaply. Norths advantage in cheaper services
intermediates becomes outweighed by the cheaper labour in the South
(which is wL = 1). As a manufacturing rm relocates to the South to take
advantage of the cheaper cost of labour there, it further reinforces the
attraction of the South through intra-industry input-output linkages. Be-
cause of this process of cumulative causation, more manufacturing rms
relocate to the South until equilibrium is restored23. The key point is
that the advantage Northern manufacturers have in terms of lower ser-
vices intermediates cost is no longer enough to sustain a large number of
23In equilibrium, there will still be some manufacturing rms in the North. The
presence of a large number of services rms means that there will still be demand for
manufacturing intermediates.
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manufacturers in the North at low levels of services trade cost. This is an
interesting result since the loss of manufacturing or deindustrialisation
in the North is not triggered by greater goods trade liberalisation (M
is kept constant in this set of results). Services trade liberalisation alone
can trigger the deindustrialisation process.
The evolution of equilibrium wages is given in Figure 6. Trade costs
are falling from the left to the right of the diagram. The boundary line
at around S = 0:2, representing the services wage-break point, is the
point where all skilled workers become fully employed in services. To the
right of this point, skilled workers begin to earn a premium wK > wL.
The biggest di¤erence between wK and wL occurs at intermediate levels
of S (around S = 0:43 or S = 1:23).
Figure 6: Equilibrium Wages (Second Wave) North
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At around S = 0:8 when the North su¤ers from a precipitous loss
of manufacturing, K type workers in the North experience a wage spike.
Consider what happens at this point. Norths manufacturing sector has
become so small that wL becomes 1. In other words, some L type workers
are reduced to working in agriculture, earning the same wage as O type
workers. Much of manufacturing intermediates are now mainly imported
from the South and they are subjected to trade cost. Due to the sud-
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den relocation of manufacturing to the South, the CES price aggregate
for manufacturing increases sharply in the North. Firms in the services
sector demand three types of inputs - K-type workers, services interme-
diates and manufacturing intermediates. As the cost of manufacturing
intermediates increases, rms substitute away from the last source of in-
put towards the previous two. The e¤ect of this is that wK will rise
sharply to restore equilibrium in the factor market.
5 Factor Responses and Changes in En-
dowments
International trade can be driven by inherent di¤erences between coun-
tries giving rise to comparative advantage or by increasing returns to
scale. Yet surprisingly little is known of the relative importance between
the two except for the study by Davis and David E. Weinstein (1999).
In this model, relative factor abundance (skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled
workers) may determine where industries locate, but not necessarily so.
If a region is relatively abundant in skilled labour, one would naturally
expect that region to have a comparative advantage in the production of
services. However, the overall cost of production depends on intermedi-
ate inputs as well as labour. The cost of intermediates in turn depends on
the number of rms located in the region and the level of trade freedom.
Comparative advantage therefore is not only due to the relative factor
abundance but also the accidents of history - which industry agglomer-
ates where rst.
Davis and Weinstein (1999) nd evidence that Economic Geography
(or increasing returns as a motivation for trade) operates at a subnational
scale but not for international trade which is still largely dominated by
comparative advantage. However, as agglomeration of an industry of-
ten gives rise to economic rent, it is also possible that the composition
of local factors begin to change in response to the agglomeration rent.
Therefore, to the extent that factors shift endogenously in response to
the kind of industries that agglomerate, there may in fact be more Eco-
nomic Geography at work than evidence suggests. In a limited way, the
next subsection discusses the endogeneity of Economic Geography and
endowment-driven comparative advantage.
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5.1 Comparisons with Neoclassical Theories
Consider the following thought experiment. K-type workers in the North
earn a premium over L-types if services trade is su¢ ciently liberalised.
Suppose there is an increase in K-type workers relative to L-types, what
will happen to industrial locations and wages24? In this set of numerical
solutions, the number of K-type workers in the North is increased by 10
units (or 10 per cent increase from baseline) and the number of L type
workers is correspondingly decreased by 10 units (10 per cent decrease).
For the world as a whole, this implies an increase in the number of K-
type workers (by 5 per cent from baseline) and decrease in the number of
L-types (by 5 per cent). The resulting industry shares are presented in
Figure 7, which one can compare to Figure 5 showing the shares before
the changes in endowment occur.
Figure 7: Tomahawk Diagram (Second Wave) with K Type Increase in
North
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As more semi-skilled workers become skilled, this further expands the
24One can think of the increase in K-types workers to arise from a process of skill
acquisition, where the L-type workers acquire skills in response to the higher wages (or
agglomeration rent) in the services sector. This paper does not model the dynamics of
skills acquisition. Instead, the initial endowment is changed to reect the acquisition
of skills and a comparative static analysis is carried out.
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services sector in the North by facilitating more services agglomeration.
Compared to Figure 5, the comparative static shows that the share of
Norths manufacturing is even lower now at every level of services trade
cost. Together, these present a quasi-Rybczynski e¤ect, that is the ex-
pansion of the sector that uses the increased factor and a contraction of
the other sector. Since inter-industry linkages are stronger than intra-
industry ones, the cost of intermediates for manufacturing rises while
that for services falls.
Figure 8: Equilibrium North Wages with Increase in K
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In equilibrium, it is possible that wK rises even more, even though
there is a relative increase in K-type workers in the North (and globally
as well)25. This can be seen by comparing the wages shown in Figure 8
to that of Figure 6, without the increase in K-types. This is di¤erent
from the prediction of neoclassical theories where one would expect the
increase in a factor relative to another to either lead to decrease in relative
wage (for a large country) or to have no e¤ect at all (for a small country).
25Obviously, the result is dependent on the parameters chosen. If the number of K-
type skilled workers is so abundant in the North that the full agglomeration of services
there does not exhaust the pool of K workers, then wK = wL. In other words, even
after allowing for the increase in K type workers, the employment constraint must
bind (all K workers employed in services).
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To draw the link between globalisation and developed economies
blue-collar wage decrease under the neoclassical model, economists have
to demonstrate the price e¤ect - that is, how trade liberalisation has re-
duced the relative price of goods which use blue-collar workers intensively
[Feenstra and Hanson (1999)]. Simply put, the terms of trade have to
move against a sector in order to account for the fall in the relative return
of the factor used intensively in that sector in any neoclassical setting.
This is simply a restatement of the Stolpher-Samuelson theorem.
With increasing returns, input-output linkages and Economic Geog-
raphy, this paper shows that a non-standard, or even surprising result,
can emerge. The increase in the number of K-type workers in the North
has led to a relative decrease in the (aggregated) price of services, yet
this is accompanied by an increase in the returns to workers employed in
that sector. In other words, the further agglomeration of services in the
North results in the worsening of terms of trade or price e¤ects, but at
the same time leads to the relative increase in the factor return to skilled
workers used in that sector. This is in sharp contrast to the Stolper-
Samuelson prediction. The wage ratio, or relative wage, between skilled
and unskilled becomes higher.
5.2 O¤shoring and Wages
More recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2006), af-
ter further slicing the production of goods into a continuum of tasks,
also show that o¤shoring of low-skilled work does not depress low-skilled
wages if there are no terms of trade e¤ects (such as in the case of a
small country). In fact, o¤shoring of low-skilled work could increase
low-skilled wages due to the productivity e¤ect (or if the productivity
e¤ect is stronger than the terms of trade e¤ect). However, the authors
framework is still very much neoclassical in nature.
In this paper with increasing returns to scale and input-output link-
ages, the prediction is again di¤erent. As more and more manufacturing
rms migrate to the South, the sector becomes e¤ectively o¤shored and
intermediates have to be imported from the South. This represents a loss
of intra-industry forward linkages, leading to an absolute decline in wL in
order to restore the equilibrium [see Figures 4 and 6]. By considering the
e¤ects forward linkages have on equilibrium wages, the conclusion about
o¤shoring becomes less favourable for the less-skilled workers.
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5.2.1 Worsening Inequality in the North
The upshot of all this is that the increase in skilled workers endowment
in the North may worsen rather than ameliorate income inequality there.
Indeed, Bound and Johnson (1995) point out that One of the major
puzzles about the wage structure during the 1980s [for the US] is why
the returns to observed skills (education and experience) rose while the
labour force has become more educated and older.There is indeed much
evidence suggesting that skill-biased technology change can to a large
extent explain this puzzle. However, skill-biased technological change
does not account for one of the key stylised facts of the recent wave of
globalisation, which is the deindustrialisation of many OECD countries.
Furthermore, Feenstra (1998) notes that we should not assess the
proximate cause of the decline in employment and wage of unskilled
workers by attributing all within-industry shifts in labour to technol-
ogy, and allowing trade to operate only via between industry shifts . .
. as soon as trade in intermediates is permitted, as with outsourcing,
then the changes in demand for labour within industry can occur due to
trade as well. In fact, the whole distinction between tradeand technol-
ogybecomes suspect when we think of corporations shifting activities
overseas.
5.3 Wage Inequality in the South
In the various sets of numerical solutions shown thus far, wage inequality
appears only for the North. However, with a suitable choice of para-
meters, it is possible to show that inequality also arises in the South.
The concentration of manufacturing in the South in the second wave of
globalisation can lead to skilled and semi-skilled workers earning a wage
premium above their unskilled counterparts (exactly the same process
that occurred in the North during the rst wave)26. Figure 9 is the
Souths counterpart to Figure 6. As trade costs fall from the left to
the right of the diagram, it shows the e¤ect of Souths skilled and semi-
skilled wages when manufacturing agglomerates in the second wave27. At
around S = 0:8 (when manufacturing shifts dramatically to the South),
26Some economists have noted that inequality in developing countries can arise since
the production that is o¤shored from developed countries allows the skilled workers
in the developing countries to earn a wage premium above the rest of the population.
27An example of such a situation would be the income disparity between the ur-
banised manufacturing workers and the rural farmers in China.
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there is an increase in the skilled and semi-skilled wages in the South over
their unskilled counterparts. Again, note that this is entirely triggered
by services trade liberalisation, which displaces manufacturing from the
North. What began as sharp inequality between nations can end up
becoming sharp inequality within nations.
Figure 9: Skilled and Semi-Skilled Wages in South (Second Wave)
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6 Conclusion
NEG models often rely on some simplifying assumptions, for example
the presence of a homogeneous and costlessly traded good that equalises
wages everywhere. In addition, due to the feedback mechanism in many
NEG models, full analytical solutions are sometimes not possible. In its
place, numerical solutions are often used to derive the economic under-
standing. In this paper, the tractability problem faced by a standard
NEG model is made even more complicated with labour market segmen-
tation, adjustments and wage dynamics. Furthermore, agglomeration
forces operate in two di¤erent channels (inter and intra-industry) asym-
metrically for given values of trade costs. Because of these complexities,
only numerical solutions are provided. Naturally, numerical solutions
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have to be interpreted with a degree of caution. The results often change
with parameter specications. Without a full analytical solution, it is
sometimes di¢ cult to tell if the results are general enough for them to be
plausible explanations of reality, a point this paper concedes. The advan-
tage of numerical solution however is that it shows the rich equilibrium
paths of locations and wages that can emerge in the model, and allows
one to understand the complex dynamics of the globalisation process.
The contribution of this paper is that it reconciles several key styl-
ised facts within a single Economic Geography framework. The story
runs as follows. The improvement of communication technology in the
recent wave of globalisation brings about a change in the specialisation
of developed economies by allowing greater services agglomeration from
their position of initial advantage in the rst wave. Firstly, it results in a
loss of workers from Norths manufacturing sector due to competition for
skilled workers. Secondly, greater services trade liberalisation results in
the loss of forward linkages for Norths manufacturing rms by allowing
Souths manufacturing sector to access services inputs cheaply. If services
trade is free enough (such as in S = 0:8 in Figure 5), this can trigger
a precipitous shift of manufacturing to the South or deindustrialisation
(which implies greater o¤shoring). The loss of employment and forward
linkages in Norths manufacturing sector then reduces the wage of semi-
skilled workers in the North. The increase in skilled labour in the North
further accentuates this process and results in even greater inequality.
By explicitly modelling the agglomeration process with labour markets
constraints, and treating the globalisation process as two distinct waves,
this paper shows how the shifts in economic geography can explain many
stylised facts.This paper therefore provides a stylised understanding of
the history of North-South industrial development and the patterns of
trade.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Patterns of Specialisation in Major Developed
and Developing Economies
Table 1: Current Account Balances (US Millions) of Goods (Top) and
Services (Bottom) of Major OECD and Emerging Economies
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
-4223 -637 1766 -5355 -9751 -4715 1738 -5423 -15147 -18031 -13319 -9596
-917 224 151 -852 128 938 736 1220 1818 511 533 837
-3157 -5452 -6654 -6604 -1261 -698 2651 13121 24794 33666 44757 46115
-7495 -8057 -9309 -9041 -6977 -7162 -7759 -4957 -4931 -4677 -8148 -9656
18050 19535 46222 46614 35982 34474 34017 44167 44652 58982 134189
-6093 -1984 -3398 -2777 -5341 -5601 -5933 -6784 -8573 -9699 -9391
11004 14957 26955 24873 17627 -3300 3535 7506 3237 -4759 -28523 -37692
14339 15107 16713 17347 18607 19805 17841 17128 15819 14554 13229 10382
65320 70890 71157 76047 69662 55986 88364 126607 145928 187445 189691 199775
-53440 -51714 -48149 -51606 -57917 -55018 -54142 -43192 -50712 -51164 -51989 -47899
38710 53985 39995 36335 23488 9555 15587 13241 11209 11001 666 -11964
6338 7183 7785 4891 1199 1076 16 -2868 -2668 1465 -649 -1851
-10721 -14635 -14787 -15613 -13705 -16496 -12047 -9556 -14633 -28075 -46915 -61239
175 347 1276 2086 2238 3412 2865 4435 6401 13050 22225 29043
6533 5948 10075 18429 20643 25042 22696 23513 24563 20152 22323
-8071 -8538 -9666 -7609 -7777 -10423 -10380 -10382 -12108 -8811 -10803
131231 83595 101740 122116 123063 116506 70191 93675 105863 132903 94978 81200
-57298 -62297 -54072 -49311 -54006 -47608 -43750 -42029 -35501 -38991 -27905 -20131
-4444 -14965 -3179 41627 28371 16954 13488 14777 21952 37569 32683 29214
-2979 -6179 -3200 1024 -651 -2848 -3872 -8198 -7424 -8046 -13658 -18763
23790 22702 20925 20274 15916 17870 19174 18407 36528 41846 46328 48107
1120 1970 3258 2511 2570 -2109 -2467 -1042 -699 4258 6796 5608
19816 21593 14913 16429 36014 60172 48121 46335 59860 85825 118364 139234
-9637 -5384 -5945 -4083 -4284 -6665 -9131 -9886 -10894 -12693 -13894 -13812
-18612 -16048 -14219 -21459 -31938 -37076 -34569 -34409 -45008 -66670 -85261 -100593
17420 18965 18239 19744 20498 19421 20559 21100 26212 26943 27677 27657
-18973 -21413 -20216 -36140 -47001 -49920 -59358 -71570 -79387 -111575 -125044 -142739
14135 17416 23130 24292 22052 20804 20804 24863 31259 47525 44828 53351
-174170 -191000 -198428 -248221 -347819 -454690 -429519 -484955 -550892 -669578 -787149 -838271
77786 86935 90155 82081 82729 74855 64393 61230 53977 57488 72778 79749
Brazil
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
Korea
Netherlands
Russia
Australia
Italy
India
Indonesia
Japan
France
Germany
China
Countries with persistent goods decits and services surpluses are:
India, Spain, UK and United States. Countries with persistent goods
surpluses and services decits are: China, Germany, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea and Russia. Countries with persistent goods surpluses: Nether-
lands. Countries with persistent services surpluses: France.
7.2 Model Parameters
Intra and Inter-industry Linkages The 1998 UK Input-Output Ta-
ble with a total of 40 sectors covering both goods and services is used
as a reference for parameter choice. The rst 6 sectors spanning mostly
primary products - agriculture, mining, food and tobacco, textile, wood,
paper - are dropped. The utility sectors like construction and power gen-
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eration are also dropped since they are infrastructural in nature (sectors
25-26). Services sectors that are mostly domestically oriented like hotels
and restaurants (sector 28), real estate (sector 32), public administration
and security (sector 37) are also dropped.
Of the remaining, sectors 7 to 24, spanning all industrial manufac-
tured goods are taken as a whole to be the goods cluster. Sectors 27 to
40, spanning a whole range of services including wholesale and retail, -
nance, insurance, research and development, post & telecommunication,
transport & storage and business services are considered as a whole to
be the services cluster.
Ignoring the e¤ects of production taxes, this paper checks for the
intra- and inter-cluster linkages, taking the two broad clusters as dened.
Checking the within and between cluster demands for intermediates, the
goods clusters inter and intra-industry linkages are 0.40 and 0.21 respec-
tively. For the services cluster, the corresponding numbers are 0.43 and
0.06.
Instead of using cluster aggregate demands for intermediates, another
measure would be to use the average intermediate demands of all dened
sectors within the specied cluster. Taking the average for sectors in the
goods cluster, the inter-industry and intra-industry linkages then become
0.44 and 0.24 respectively. Taking the average for sectors in the services
cluster, the corresponding numbers are 0.50 and 0.07. The evidence
therefore points to stronger inter-industry input-output linkages.
Elasticity David Hummels (1999) estimates that the elasticities of
most goods are in the range of 3 to 8, with an average of 5.6. This
implies an average mark-up of 22 per cent. This paper rounds down the
elasticity to 5 for both services and manufacturing sectors, implying a
mark-up of 25 per cent.
Consumption Intensities The consumption intensities for manufac-
turing and services are given as 0.4 and 0.2 respectively. The choice
of parameters here have no bearing on the qualitative results except to
note that they must be large enough (relative to endowments) so that
one location cannot hold all rms. This is to ensure that the endowment
constraints are binding enough to generate wage increases in equilibrium.
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Summary The numerical solution is carried out using MATLAB. The
baseline parameters are provided in the table below.
Table 2: Baseline Parameters for Numerical Solutions
Endowments KN = LN = UN 100
KS = LS = US 100
Industry Linkages M 0.40
M 0.10
S 0.40
S 0.10
Elasticities  5
M 0.40
S 0.20
Adjustment / Increment "F 0.01
"W 0.0001
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The e¤ects of changing endowments are already discussed in the paper.
In this small section, the paper presents some results with changes to
other parameters.
7.3.1 Lower Elasticity of Substitution ( = 4)
In this set of numerical solutions, all parameters are as per baseline spec-
ication in Table 2 except that the elasticity of substitution is lowered
to 4.
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Share in North
Trade Freeness Phi-M
Manufacturing
Services
Sig=4
First Wave Locations
1.00
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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Sig=4
First Wave Wages
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The e¤ects of lowering the substitution elasticity does not change the
analysis qualitatively. However, due to the lower elasticity, the strength
of agglomeration is higher, thereby resulting in lowering the break /
sustained points and increasing the location shares. The wage impact
for the semi and skilled workers is also higher compared to when  =
5. For the second wave, the paper again assumes that the rst wave
agglomeration has occured in the North.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Share in North
Trade Freeness Phi-S
Manufacturing
Services
Sig=4
Second Wave Locations (North)
1.00
1.20
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Skilled and Semi-skilled wages
Trade Freeness Phi-S
Sig=4
Second Wave Wages (North)
Again, the e¤ect of lowering elasticity is to increase the strength of
agglomeration and its impact on wages.
7.3.2 Increasing Strength of Intra Industry Linkage (M =
S = 0:45)
In this set of numerical solutions, all parameters are as per baseline spec-
ication except that the strength of intra-industry linkage is increased
from 0.4 to 0.45.
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Increasing the strength of the intra-industry linkage has the same
qualitative e¤ect as lowering the elasticity. Namely, the force of agglom-
eration increases, resulting in higher wage impact.
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